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1. INTRODUCTION
Damages from the offshore Tohoku earthquake of
March 11, 2011 was on a scale beyond our imagination.
Through this horrific event, we have learned how a disaster
can adversely affect people and country and how serious
the result would be, if the earthquake event triggers a nuclear
power plant (NPP) accident. Even though the accident
initiated by an earthquake induced tsunami, the station
black-out amplified the severity. As a result there is a need
for counter measures for the potential risk from earthquakes
to be emphasized. 
Historically, the Korean peninsula has been stable and
it has a low likelihood of a severe seismic event, with very
few questions on earthquake induced fatalities being
seriously discussed. In July 2007, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
NPPs in Japan were damaged by a severe earthquake of
magnitude 6.8. It is remarkable that this was the first
occurrence of the integrity of NPPs being compromised
by a severe earthquake that exceeds the operating basis
earthquake (OBE). From the lessons learned in the Japanese
case, the Korean government has raised the need for an
automatic reactor trip system to be considered for both NPP
safety and public acceptance. Moreover, the earthquake
induced tsunami in 2011 that brought about the core melt-
down and hydrogen explosion in the Fukushima NPPs
makes an automatic seismic trip system (ASTS) an essential
system for preventing a disaster at NPPs.
Figure 1 illustrates the design process for the digitalized
ASTS. The four (4) rounded rectangular boxes represent
the stages for the process and the text box under each stage
contains the identified activities to be performed during
each stage. The design work was completed when the
design verification was finished. Beyond these processes,
the implementation, test, verification and validation work
followed on the right leg of V-model, but this is not shown
in this diagram, below. 
In order to analyze the needs, the lessons learned from
Japan and Taiwan were investigated. They have installed
a ASTS as one of the counter measures for earthquake
induced accidents, so a study of their system would be
the good initiation point of the research. Throughout the
needs analysis, the performance and function were identified.
The next stage was the requirements analysis. This was
the starting point of problem solving therefore, making
complete and correct requirements was essential work at
this stage. Specifically, the licensing and user requirements
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were the basis of this work. The third stage was the system
design. To decide the configuration of the system, not only
the dedicated sensing and coincidence part of the ASTS,
but also the trip initiation circuit should have been inves-
tigated. In this stage, logic drawing was also developed.
The final stage was to verify the design. As verification
measures, the system reliability and availability are selected.
The design input was taken from the reference design
experience. In this case, the operating NPP design data
was brought into the verification work.
By adapting a systems engineering approach into the
ASTS design, we  could get a broad perspective of the
design in the incipient stage. The process and activities to
be performed were identified before the needs analysis stage.
Through this approach, the schedule and investment could
be optimized. It took around one year for system design.
It was quite short period of time to design the system con-
sidering it had a new operational and functional concept.  
2. NEEDS ANALYSIS
Figure 2 shows how needs are analyzed. The diagram is
redrawn using needs analysis flow diagram of A. Kossiakoff
et el [1]. This stage begins with analyzing the need for an
ASTS. Most predecessor designs have been designed to
trip the reactor by actuation of the reactor trip system (RPS).
It means that the ASTS gives an extra trip parameter to
the RPS. There were some limitations in the system not to
introduce the unqualified system. In addition, the prede-
cessor systems which were developed by Japan, Taiwan,
and USA, have been used analog system but it became
obsolete. The need to decide the trip logic is the other
essential part of analysis. The predecessor systems have a
RPS trip function, but it decreased the availability of the
system including pseudo reactor trip possibility. Table 1
shows a SWOT (strong, weakness, opportunity and threat)
analysis result of the predecessor system. 
Table 2 shows the technical opportunity of the alternative
design. It is based on the digitalized hardware system.
Since Korean NPP systems are designed and developed
by digitalized systems, the stages and process are well
established. However, the digitalized ASTS has concerns
of not having reference design. One more item to be ana-
lyzed is the introduction of  the indirect trip function as a
DPS (diverse protection system).
The second process to be performed is the functional
analysis. As shown in figure 2, the needs and operational
approach of the ASTS are used as the input to decide on
the function. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had
called a meeting on the advisability of an the ASTS in
April 1995. Throughout this meeting, the recommendation
was raised as [2];
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Fig. 1. ASTS Design Stages
Fig. 2. Process and Activities of Needs Analysis Stage 
(Where, DPS: Diverse Protection System, RPS: Digital Reactor
Protection System)
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• It is preferable to install an ASTS at a high seismicity
site such as Japan and the west bay area of America
where high seismic hazards are estimated. However,
if the confidence about the NPP safe operation, such
as credit for the operator action during an earthquake,
or the public acceptance is low, then the installation
can’t be considered.
• Trip setpoint can be set in consideration of both the
hazard level and the SSE level of the specific NPP.
The OBE can be used as the system trigger level. The
reactor trip must be taken place prior to the maximum
seismic level.
In this meeting, the potential disadvantages of the
ASTS were pointed out [3]. Even though the PGA
exceeded the OBE level, if the frequency of the wave is
over 17Hz, it doesn’t cause  serious damage to the NPP.
One more fact that we have to notice is the duration of
the earthquake. In general, the duration is shorter than
two (2) seconds. Those discussions were a good starting
point of the design. 
For elicitation of the requirements, the currently avail-
able systems from Japan, Taiwan, and USA were reviewed.
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the system design from
those three countries. They preferred to add one more trip
parameter into the existing RPS (reactor protection system).
As seen in Table 3, Japan mandates a ASTS by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) order
62 [4]. Before the Niigata Chuetsu-oki earthquake in
2007, MITI recommended to use 0.9S1, where S1 is the
maximum design earthquake, for the trip setpoint, refer-
encing the JEAG (Japan Electric Association Guideline)
4601 criteria [5]. But the NSC (Nuclear Safety Commission)
has changed the trip setpoint incorporating the lessons
learned from the Niigata earthquake. The revised setpoint
is set at 120 gal.
Taiwan nuclear authority requested to install the ASTS
in all six existing NPPs after the disastrous Chi-Chi
earthquake. The scram level was set to OBE ZPA (zero
period acceleration) minus 0.05g. The OBE ZPA level is
obtained from the range of 0.1Hz to 10Hz. 
In the USA, only two plants in California have installed
the ASTS. They are Diablo Canyon and San Onofre. These
installations were not because of the USNRC’s regulation,
but for the ACRS (advisory committee for reactor safety)
Analog system
RPS trip
Experienced
Easy to design 
Obsolescence
License ability
Reducing design work
Trip possibility 
Decrease system
reliability
Plant availability
Table 1. SWOT Analysis Result of Predecessor System
Limitation of predecessor
system Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat
Digitalized system
Indirect reactor trip 
Modernization
Licensing unnecessary
Inexperienced
Proven by quantitative
manner
Availability and
Reliability
Plant availability
Increase hazard level
Possibility of failure of
reactor trip
Table 2. SWOT Analysis Result of Alternative Design
Limitation of predecessor
system Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat
Table 3. ASTS Design Characteristics of Three Countries
Nation Background of
ASTS
Basis for
Setpoint
Sensor
installation Trip circuit Safety class System type
Japan
Mandated by
MITI Ordinance
62
120gal
(before 2006,
0.9S1)
Taiwan
Recommend
from nuclear
authority
OBE’s ZPA-
0.05g
USA Optional OBE
Free field Reactor tripSwitchgear Safety Analog
concern. This was because the qualification level of the
main equipment was beyond the revised SSE level due to
newly found Hosgri fault.
Until 2012, the Korean NPPs used the manual reactor
trip function to cope with seismic events. When an earth-
quake level is over the OBE, the operator is obliged to
trip the reactor, then a walkthrough is mandated to check
the integrity of the plant. The clients’ needs were rooted
from this background. Therefore, the needs were extracted
that the ASTS should not increase the possibility of loss
of electricity generation while it satisfies both the safety
and public acceptance. This somewhat contradictory need
must be accomplished. Consequently, the concerns have
been raised on how we can satisfy those needs and control
the overall cost, because, total 20 units were scheduled to
be equipped with this additional system during their overhaul
outage period by the end of 2012.
As the reader can  acknowledge, the requirements from
the client were somewhat different from the reference
systems. The NPP wanted an indirect trip system to support
the operator’s manual action. If operator should be unable
to trip the reactor, then the ASTS can back up the lost action
of the operator. While those three reference systems shown
in Table 3 are signified to add one more reactor trip function,
the Korean NPPs want a standby trip function to support
the operator’s behavior.
Figure 3 shows the process for needs validation. Similar
to the design of predecessor systems, the ASTS can be
categorized into three pieces; they are sensor module,
system hardware for decision logic, and the final trip circuit.
In this process, the alternative design is compared with
the predecessor design. In terms of the sensor module
design, the measures to decide the design are cost, schedule
and performance. The second category is the system hard-
ware. The alternative, which is configured with digitalized
hardware, is compared to the analog based hardware by
measures of reliability, availability and maintainability.
Lastly, the ability to license and the operability are used to
select the trip initiation circuit. To analyze these measures,
the experience data is applied from the reference system
of the operating NPP. They are RPS and DPS.
3. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS STAGE
3.1 Top-tier Requirements
Using the given needs,  the system concept is set in
order to explore whether the needs could be converted
into the requirements without contradicting with current
regulation guidlines. As conclusion it was found that the
system that has a supporting function could be categorized
as non-safe. For this reason an ASTS was designed to satisfy
the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) regulation
guidelines for instrumentation and control (I&C) system
8.1 [6]. 
Although an ASTS wouldn’t be implemented in the
safety system, the other concern about what seismic category
must be applied to the design. Engineering judgment made
it simple work in that the system would be operated under
the SSE environment. It should be seismic category I, where
category I is defined by USNRC as; structures, systems,
and components that are designed and built to withstand
the maximum potential earthquake stresses for the particular
region where a nuclear plant is sited [7].
In addition, we decided on the adequacy of performing
the environmental qualification for the system, in consid-
eration of the postulated condition during or after the SSE.
The last concern was about the software class because major
functions will be implemented by the software. After lengthy
discussion, a decision was made to apply the class of
“important to safety”. The equivalent class of software
integrity is level 3 from IEEE 1012 [8]. 
As a result, we attained the top-tier requirements to
fulfill the licensing issues as depicted in Table 4. As shown,
the typical safety issues such as single failure criterion,
defense in depth and diversity are not applied as intended.
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Fig. 3. Process for Needs Validation
In conclusion, ASTS has two contradicting top-tier
requirements; to not  increase the possibility of loss of
electricity generation while it satisfies both the safety and
public acceptance. 
3.2 Performance Requirements
The next step was regarded to draw performance require-
ments which specify the technical, operation, and safety
of the system. Time to scram, uncertain requirements, system
availability and reliability requirements were included in this
category. Table 5 shows the performance requirements
for the ASTS.
The time to scram the reactor needs to be compared
with the expected duration of the earthquake. Automatic
scram is utilized to initiate reactor trip before the maximum
earthquake. Typically, damages from the strong motion
of the earthquake are diminished within 2 seconds [9].
Therefore, the dead band of the channel is set to 10 seconds.
When a strong earthquake is incident to an individual
channel, the bistable logic generates a trip signal and latches
onto it for 10 seconds. After 10 seconds, it is released
automatically.
The system accuracy is set to ±5% on reflection of
our design experiences and information from the INER
(Institute of Nuclear Energy Research) in Taiwan [10].
Even ANSI/ANS 2.2 [11], a criterion for the earthquake
instrument, offers the surveillance interval but there is no
criterion for the ASTS. Therefore, the reliability analysis
from the sensor to the ASTS output channel should be
conducted to know the surveillance test interval. The
initial reliability target for 6 months and 18 months are
set as 0.99 and 0.95 respectively if the PLC (programmable
logic controller) is applied.
3.3 Functional Requirements
During the design, the concern was raised on how we
can reduce the possibility of spurious trips in order to satisfy
the customers’ needs by not interrupting electricity gen-
eration. The backup data has been collected and analyzed. 
Experience has shown that the strong motion of the
earthquake comes from lower frequencies below 10Hz.
Figure 4 displays a cross plot of the corner frequency (fc)
versus seismic moment (lower scale) and moment magnitude
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Table 4. Top-tier Requirements
Items
Safety grade
Actuation device
Single Failure Criterion
Environmental Qualification
Seismic Category
Defense in Depth and Diversity
Software Class
Features
Non-safe
Load center
Not applicable
Applicable
Category I 
Not applicable
Important to Safety
Remarks
KINS regulation guide for I&C system 8.1
MG control panel 
Normal and anticipated operational occurrences.
Safety integrity level 3 per IEEE1012-1998
Table 5. Performance Requirements
Requirements
Time to Scram
Uncertainty
Unavailability
Reliability
Value
Dead band of 10 Sec 
±5%
10-6 failure/demand
6 months 0.99 18 months 0.95
Remarks
Trip output from the comparator is maintained for 10 second. 
From sensor to PLC output 
if PLC system is applied
Fig. 4. Frequency Versus Seismic Moment (Lower Scale) and
Moment Magnitude (Upper Scale) (Almann and Shearer)
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(upper scale) [12]. In this figure, the major energy band
tends to move to the lower frequencies. In other word,
when the magnitude is getting higher, the frequency is
getting lower. The frequency over Mw=5 is below 2Hz
in this figure. 
The frequency of seismic waves occurring in the eastern
part of the USA exceeded the 15 Hz was relatively short,
around two seconds. Consequently it has no impact on the
safety integrity of the NPPs [13].  The IAEA joint meeting
[14], concluded that the high frequency acceleration did
not induce damage to components. For this reason, they
decided to use an acceleration amplitude between 2-8 Hz
to exceed the OBE criteria. According to the EPRI report
[15], the peak spectral acceleration, averaged between 2Hz
and 10Hz, is a reasonably consistent threshold for damage
(i.e., conservatively defined at MMI greater than VI).
Therefore, we could conclude that the frequency acceleration
over 10Hz does not induce damage to the safety related
equipment.
The experience in Korean NPPs also proves that the
pseudo seismic signal is distinctive over 10Hz while the
triggered signal shows low frequency characteristics below
10Hz. Figure 5 shows the spectrum of pseudo seismic
waves which were detected by the SMS (seismic mon-
itoring system) in NPPs. These spectrums were captured
from the ECCS (emergency core cooling system) pump
and lightening. When the pump starts, the cavitation
generates the shock and then it propagates to the seismic
sensor and then the sensor is triggered. Lighting is also
the source that generates the shock wave to trigger the
sensor. Including these signals, many other cases showed
that the distinctive frequency from the pseudo seismic
signal was found to be over 10Hz. 
Using this background, we decided to cut-off high
frequency over 10Hz. In this case, a special filter which
fulfills both the stability and the sharpness is required. 
To keep the unavailability target, the system should be
implemented by the digitalized system. The digitalized
system has lower unavailability than the analog system.
The target value is set to about the same as the digitalized
safety system. 
Beyond these design features, the energized trip function,
and two out of four (2/4) comparator logics are applied.
Moreover, the ASTS is designed to permit the channel
bypass during the test. Those measures are set in order to
cope with an unplanned trip.
The reliability target is set as; 0.99 for 6 months and
0.95 for an 18 months surveillance period. Table 6 depicts
the distinctive functional requirements that are different
with the reference design from Japan, Taiwan and USA.
Table 6. Functional Requirements (Distinctive)
Requirements
Digitalize the channel
Block spurious trip
Do comparison
Do trip actuation 
Means
From bistable logic to the output channel
Apply 10Hz lowpass filter 
Apply two out of four logics
Cut-off power paths into RTSG
Energize thetrip 
Remarks
Trip output from the comparator is maintained for 10 seconds. 
Requires stability and the sharpness of the filter
Apply four sensors
Permit channel bypass
Allow trip bypass Trip when the channelis energized
Fig. 5. Pseudo Seismic Wave Detected by the Seismic Sensor (a) Spectrum by the ECC Pump Starting (b) Spectrum by the
Lightening.
4. SYSTEM DESIGN
4.1 System Configuration 
As shown in Figure 6, the seismic signal detected by
the accelerometer is filtered, rectified, and converted to
current. The sensor module cuts off the frequency range
over 10Hz in order to pick out the strong motion of the
earthquake. The seismic signal has positive and negative
portions, which is why the rectifier circuit is added. The
rectifier converts a bipolar signal to unipolar.
The overall scheme of the digitalized ASTS is shown
in Figure 7. The sensor output is interfaced with digital
input card at the ASTS cabinet. The decision logic is set
as two out of four, but the system is composed of two
independent channels. They are N1 and N2. For isolation
between channels the digital input/output cards are applied.
The dotted line on the ASTS cabinet is the scope of the
trip logic channels N1 and N2. The ASTS cabinet is
implemented by a digitalized system, such as the PLC
(programmable logic controller), the FPGA (field program-
mable gate array), or the DCS (distributed control system).
The bistable and decision logics are configured with soft-
ware inside each channel.
The operational principles are as follows. When the
measured signal exceeds the set-point, the edge triggering
happens and the status is set to "0" by comparator actuation.
In this case, the latch is engaged due to the edge triggering,
and keep this status for ten seconds. The purpose of the
10 second latch is to synchronize the individual channel
for the coincidence logic. If the signals are not properly
synchronized, the trip initiation signal may not be actuated
during a strong earthquake. The ASTS consists of four
(4) diverse channel applications. The bistable signal from
each channel feeds into 2-out of-4 coincidence logics for
generating a trip initiation signal.
The reactor is tripped by a cutoff in the MG set power
to the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) as shown in
Figure 8 (a), while (b) presents the overall logics of the
ASTS. As shown, it triggers the power from the MG set
to the RTSS by opening the breaker. 
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Fig. 6. Conceptual Diagram of Sensor Module for Signal Processing.
Fig. 7. Overall Scheme of Digitalized ASTS
4.2 Setpoint Analysis
Generally, the ASTS trip setpoint can be set based on
either the OBE level, or the SSE level. The reason to set
the trip value to the OBE level is for the functional integrity
of safety related systems, structures, and components (SSC).
When we set the trip value close to the SSE, the SSC
integrity may not be secured. Consequently care must be
taken not to exceed the SSE level. In this work, the trip
set-point is determined in the range from OBE to SSE
while considering both safety and availability of the plant. 
Figure 9 shows how the ASTS trip set-point is calcu-
lated. In this figure, the measured vibration motion of
NPPs is regarded as equivalent to the movement of free-
field seismic stations.
Reg. guide 1.60 determined the DRS (design response
spectra) representing the effects of the vibratory motion
of the SSE and the OBE on sites underlain by either rock
or soil deposits and covering all frequencies of interest.
The DRS, specified for design purpose, can be developed
statistically from response spectra of past strong-motion
earthquakes [16]. The time history should be converted
from the given DRS. In this case, the computed 5% damped
response spectrum of the artificial ground motion time
history shall not exceed the target response spectrum at
any frequency by more than 30% in the frequency range
of interest [17]. 
Figure 10 shows the comparison of the artificial ground
motion time history from RG 1.60 and the target response
spectrum in the range of 0.1Hz to 40Hz. 
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Fig. 8. Scheme of ASTS (a) One Channel Trip Circuit (b) Trip Logic 
Fig. 9. Conceptual Illustration for Calculating ASTS Trip Set-point [7]
Fig. 10. Comparison of (a) Time History and (b) Target Response Spectrum
Equation (1) expresses the method to obtain the ASTS
trip set-point. For calculating the ASTS set-point, the PGA
value at SSE, conversion factor, amplification factor of
the sensor location and the ASTS hardware error must be
considered.
Where, SPAST = ASTS set-point
PGASSE = PGA value at SSE
Cf = conversion factor 
Af = amplification factor 
¡hardware = ASTS hardware error 
The amplification factor is defined as the ratio of the
minimum floor response spectra (MinFRS) at the sensor
location to the design ground response spectra (DGRS)
of the free-field as depicted in Figure 11 and Equation (2).
As shown, the Af varies from plant to plant. For example,
the largest number of factors among the Korean nuclear
power plant is around 1.8 when the 10 Hz low-pass filter
is applied. In this figure YG, UN, KR, and WS stand for
the NPP names. They are Younggwang, Unchin, Kori,
and Wolseong respectively [18].
The ASTS hardware errors come from the digitalized
hardware for the trip initiation logic and trip generation
circuits. It can be broken down into three (3) elements;
sensor (accelerometer) error, signal conditioning module
error, and trip initiation logic error. The overall error is
obtained by the sum of each error component as defined
in Equation (3) since each error component is biased
each other.
where, ¡hardware = ASTS hardware error
¡ACC = accelerometer error
¡bistable = bistable logic error
The error associated with the accelerometer is control-
lable through the periodic calibration. Normally, the max-
imum error of acceleration is controlled below 3% including
all possible error sources. [19]
The error associated with the signal conditioning module
(SCM) is somewhat difficult to control due to the frequency
response of the low-pass filter. The filter error is varied
by the filter type and order. The frequency response of the
second order butterworth low-pass filter shows around 6%
of overshoot. 
Figure 12 shows the filter simulation result using real
seismic waves that occurred in Fukuoka, Japan. The event
occurred with a Mw of 7.6 in 2005. The filtered responses
show an overshoot in positive polarity and an undershoot
in negative polarity. The simulation result proves that the
filter is the dominant error source of the ASTS.
4.3 Set- point Calculation
By adaptation of the requirements of RG1.60, the 30%
of conversion margin is deducted from the PGA value of
sensor location, so the conversion factor of 0.7 is applied.
Figure 11 plots the amplification factors by the frequencies
at the reactor building basement for Korean NPPs. In this
case, the lowest amplification factor at 10 Hz is around 1.5. 
Table 7 shows the calculation results of the ASTS
trip set-point with the PGA at SSE of 0.2g. The reactor
building basement that has 1.5 of amplification factor is
projected. The calculated ASTS hardware error is 10%.
The ASTS trip set-point is decided as 5.5% lower than
the PGA at SSE. This value is the upper bound to put
NPPs under safe conditions and to keep the SSC integrity.
Figure 13 expresses the actual ASTS set-point per
NPP. It indicates that the applied trip set-point for an
individual NPP is decided on below the upper bound
depicted in Table 7 except Wolsong (WS) 1 and Ulchin
(UN) 1&2. In this case, the amplification factor of WS 1
and UN 1&2 shown in Figure 11 affect to the setpoint
calculation.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
Fig. 12. Sensor with Filter response for X-axis Seismic Wave 
(Butterworth Filter ; Type= 8-order/BW, Cutoff Frequency=
10Hz, Bandwidth=20Hz).
Fig. 11. Plots of Amplification Factors (at Reactor Basement)
5. DESIGN VERIFICATION
To verify the design, the ASTS reliability is calculated
using the RBD (reliability block diagram) method. Firstly,
the sensor module is modeled then analyzed. Figures 14
and 15 respectively show the simplified RBD for the
ASTS and sensor module respectively. Where, block 1
represents the reliability of sensor module and block 2
shows the overall reliability of ASTS. 
Table 8 shows the applied data for the calculation. The
failure distribution for the system is assumed to exponential
since the equipment is composed of electronic devices.
For the calculation, Bellfore Component Library is applied.
The failure rate of rectifier is not accounted here because
it is about 1. Equation (4) shows the reliability expression
as having an exponential distribution.
Where, h=failure rate (failure/hour)
t=time (hour)
Table 9 shows the failure rate and reliability for
sensor and module. Where the reliability of the sensor is
calculated using the block diagram shown in Figure 16. 
Table 10 shows the applied data for the calculation of
ASTS cabinet. For this calculation, the data from the ref-
erence plant, Ulchin NPP 5&6 PLC, is applied as Table 11.
The calculation result using the above method is as
shown in Table 11. Where, BS logic involves the com-
ponents and modules from the analog input to input of
two-out-four decision logic. The reason why we separate
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SPPGA
0.189g
PGASSE
0.2g
Cf
0.7
Af
1.5
¡ASTS
0.1
PAGSSE – SPPGA
PAGSSE
5.5%
Table 7. Calculated ASTS Set-point (Upper Bound)
Fig. 13. Actual ASTS Set-point Per NPP
Components
Sensor
Low-pass filter
VI Converter
Sensor Module
Reliability
Table 9. Failure Rate and Reliability for Sensor and Module 
Failure rate
1.039174E-08
9.559375E-09
9.559375E-09
2.951049E-08
6 months
0.999955109
0.999958704
0.999958704
0.9998725228
18 months
0.999865332
0.999876118
0.999876118
0.9996176172
Components
Capacitor
Resistor, Fixed
IC, Analog/Linear
Inductor
Failure rate (Bellcore)
1.881343E-09
2.606911E-09
5.071121E-09
8.323655E-10
Table 8. Data for Failure Rate of Components (from Bellcore Com-
Ponent Library)
Fig. 15. Simplified RBD for Block 1
Fig. 14. Simplified RBD for AC-23 Accelerometer
(4)
the decision logic and BS (bistable) logic is that single
two-out-four decision logics of one channel is made by
receiving two digital outputs from the adjacent channel. 
The remaining items to be analyzed are breakers installed
on the MG set control panel and reactor trip circuit breaker
system (RTSS). The simplified RBD and the analysis results
are shown in Figure 17 and Table 12 respectively. 
The reliability analysis results for the ASTS using RBD
are as shown in Table 13. 
Figure 18 shows the calculated reliability by time.
Because the reliability is inversely proportional to the time,
the calibration period must be kept to maintain the target
reliability. Through the reliability test, we validate that the
ASTS can satisfy 0.95 of reliability without calibration
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Table 11. Failure Rate and Reliability for Bistable Logic
Components
BS Logic
Failure rate
4.790000E-06
Reliability
6 months
0.92975404086681
18 months
0.80371897856769
Fig. 16. Schematic Diagram for Seismic Sensor
Components
Analog input module
Processor module
Digital input/output module
Failure rate (Ulchin 5&6 PLC)
1.150000E-06
3.010000E-06
6.300000E-07
Table 10. Data for Failure Rate of Components (from Refer-
ence Plant)
Fig. 17. Simplified RBD for Block 1
Block(MG-Set)
Relay
Circuit Breaker
Block(RTSS)
TCB
UVTCR
STCR
Components Failure rate
Reliability
1.079900E-06/h
1.020000E-06/h
0.059200E-06/h
4.790000E-06
1.150000E-06
3.010000E-06
6.300000E-07
6 months
0.995345697
0.979519827
18 months
0.986101978
0.939809203
Table 12. Failure Rate and Reliability for MG Set and RTSS
Table 13. Reliability Analysis Results for the ASTS using RBD
Reliability Block
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
ASTS
Reliability
6 months
0.99999125176663
0.92975404086681
0.92542668383955
0.99443882051683
18 months
0.99977800357934
0.80371897857061
0.79254887433766
0.95696403046143
Failure rate
1- [1-Rsensor(t)* Rfilter(t)* Rconverter(t)* RBSLogic(t)]3
[6Rblock12(t) - 8Rblock13(t) + 3Rblock14(t)]*R2/4Logic
Rblock2(t)*RMG-SET(t)
1- [1-Rblock3(t)]2
for 18 months. Then the functional test for the entire signal
path is enough for 6 months as similar as criteria shown
in ANSI/ANS 2.2 for seismic sensor. 
6. CONCLUSION
This work shows the overall design stages of the ASTS
using a systems engineering approach. It refers to the
standard lifecycle process defined by ISO/IEC 15288 [20],
but is modified to fit the operation of nuclear power plants. 
By applying the systems engineering approach into
the ASTS design, we can get a broad perspective of the
design at the inception stage. The processes and activities
to be performed are identified before the needs analysis
stage. Through this approach, the schedule and investment
can be optimized. It took around one year for the system
design. It is quite short period of time to design the system
considering it has quite new operational and functional
concept.
ASTS is to provide proactive measure for the earthquake
event. We expect that system unavailability will not be
increased by introducing the ASTS for the indirect reactor
trip function. 
In Korea the operating NPPs have equipped the ASTS
and now the design work is progressing for newly con-
structed NPPs. The characteristics of Korean ASTS design
are:
• First kind of work to be performed by the systematic
approach
• Digitalized and modular design
• Standardized design to fit the various reactor types
• Trip the reactor through diverse channel application 
By designing the ASTS both fully digitalized and in a
non-nuclear safe class, we can get some flexibility in the
system design and implementations such as;
• Software discrimination algorithms can easily be
applied for omitting the pseudo shock waves which
is a likely incident
• System reliability can be increased due to configuring
the major decision algorithm by software functional
blocks
Throughout this work, the importance of filter design
was identified in order to reduce the likelihood of a pseudo
reactor trip. Yet the conventional accelerometer has a
broader frequency range that is needed for application to
NPPs. Therefore the external circuit which picks out the
necessary frequency range as sharply as possible is essential.
Normally higher order filters are applied but this introduces
some level of uncertainty that adversely reduces the
setpoint. 
For performing the design verification quantitatively,
specific methodologies to deal with setpoint and reliability
have been developed. In order for  this work, the RBD
(reliability block diagram) method was applied. The results
tell that the digitalized ASTS would not decrease both
availability and reliability. 
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Fig. 18. Calculated Reliability Curve by Time
